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Strongly Separable Codes
Jing Jiang, Minquan Cheng and Ying Miao
Abstract
Binary t-frameproof codes (t-FPCs) are used in multimedia fingerprinting schemes where the identification of authorized users
taking part in the averaging collusion attack is required. In this paper, a binary strongly t-separable code (t-SSC) is introduced
to improve such a scheme based on a binary t-FPC. A binary t-SSC has the same traceability as a binary t-FPC but has more
codewords than a binary t-FPC. A composition construction for binary t-SSCs from q-ary t-SSCs is described, which stimulates
the research on q-ary t-SSCs with short length. Several infinite series of optimal q-ary 2-SSCs of length 2 are derived from the
fact that a q-ary 2-SSC of length 2 is equivalent to a q-ary 2-separable code of length 2. Combinatorial properties of q-ary 2-SSCs
of length 3 are investigated, and a construction for q-ary 2-SSCs of length 3 is provided. These 2-SSCs of length 3 have more
than 12.5% codewords than 2-FPCs of length 3 could have.
Index Terms
Multimedia fingerprinting, separable code, strongly separable code, frameproof code, tracing algorithm
I. INTRODUCTION
Multimedia content protection has become an important security issue in recent years, as illegal redistribution of licensed
materials has become increasingly prevalent. Cryptographic techniques were introduced to ensure that only authorized users are
able to use them. Unfortunately, cryptographic approaches are limited in that once the content is decrypted, it can potentially
be copied and redistributed freely. In order to hinder the unauthorized redistribution of digital data, digital fingerprinting was
introduced to trace the authorized users who redistribute their contents for unintended purposes [3]. Fingerprints for multimedia
data can be embedded through a variety of watermarking techniques prior to their authorized distribution [7], [10].
Fingerprinting can be an effective technique for inhibiting malicious authorized users from distributing their copies of the
media. However, if fingerprints are not well designed, fingerprinting systems would become invalid when a group of users
form a collusion by cleverly combining their copies to create a pirate copy. Among others, the averaging attack is an attempt to
remove the embedded fingerprints by averaging all the fingerprinted signals with an equal weight for each colluder, so that no
colluder would take more of a risk than any other colluders. This attack also reduces the power of each contributing fingerprint
and makes the colluded signal have better perceptual quality.
Various anti-collusion codes have been introduced to resist collusion attacks. Frameproof codes (FPCs) were first introduced
to prevent a coalition from framing a user not in the coalition in [3], but widely considered as having no traceability for generic
digital data (see for example [11]). However, Cheng and Miao [6] showed that frameproof codes actually have traceability
for multimedia contents. This greatly strengthens the importance of frameproof codes in fingerprinting. Unfortunately, in most
cases, the number of codewords in a t-FPC is too small to be of practical use. In this paper, we introduce a new notion of a
binary strongly t-separable code (t-SSC) which has weaker requirements than a binary t-FPC but has the same traceability as
a binary t-FPC. Usually, t-SSCs have much more codewords than t-FPCs could have.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we first recall some basic concepts of fingerprinting, collusion, and detection.
In Section III, we introduce the concept of an SSC, and describe a colluder-tracing algorithm based on a binary SSC. We also
show a composition construction for binary SSCs from q-ary SSCs, which makes the study of q-ary SSCs with short length
important. In Section IV, we derive several infinite series of optimal q-ary 2-SSCs of length 2 from the fact that a q-ary 2-SSC
of length 2 is equivalent to a q-ary 2-separable code (2-SC) of length 2. Combinatorial properties of q-ary 2-SSCs of length
3 are also investigated and a construction for q-ary 2-SSCs of length 3 is also presented in Section IV. Finally, conclusions
will be given in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give a brief review on some basic terminologies. The interested reader is referred to [6], [9] for more
detailed information.
In collusion-resistant fingerprinting, we want to design fingerprints which can be used to trace and identify colluders
after collusion attacks, together with robust embedding of fingerprints into multimedia host signals. Spread-spectrum additive
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2embedding is one of the widely employed robust embedding techniques. Let x be the host multimedia signal, {ui | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
be an orthonormal basis of noise-like signals, {wj = (wj(1),wj(2), . . . ,wj(n)) =
∑n
i=1 bijui | 1 ≤ j ≤ M}, bij ∈ {0, 1},
be a family of watermarks, and {αwj | 1 ≤ j ≤ M}, α ∈ R+, be the scaled watermarks to achieve the imperceptibility as
well as to control the energy of the embedded watermark. The watermarked version of the content yj = x+αwj , 1 ≤ j ≤M ,
is then assigned to the authorized user Uj who has purchased the rights to access x. The fingerprint wj assigned to Uj can
be represented uniquely by a vector (called codeword) bj = (b1j , b2j , . . . , bnj)T ∈ {0, 1}n because of the linear independence
of the basis {ui | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
When t authorized users, say Uj1 , Uj2 , . . . , Ujt , who have the same host content but distinct fingerprints come together, we
assume that they have no way of manipulating the individual orthonormal signals, that is, the underlying codeword needs to
be taken and proceeded as a single entity, but they can carry on a linear collusion attack to generate a pirate copy from their t
fingerprinted contents, so that the venture traced by the pirate copy can be attenuated. In additive embedding, this is done by
linearly combining the t fingerprinted contents
∑t
ℓ=1 λjℓyjℓ , where the weights {λjℓ ∈ R+ | 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ t} satisfy the condition∑t
ℓ=1 λjℓ = 1 to maintain the average intensity of the original multimedia signal. In this case, the energy of each of the
scaled watermarks αwjℓ is reduced by a factor of λ2jℓ , therefore, the trace of Ujℓ’s fingerprint becomes weaker and thus Ujℓ
is less likely to be caught by the detector. Since normally no colluder is willing to take more of a risk than any other colluder,
averaging attack in which λjℓ = 1/t, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ t, is the most fair choice for each colluder to avoid detection, as claimed in [9],
[12]. This attack also makes the pirate copy have better perceptional quality. Based on the discussions above, the observed
content y after averaging attack is
y =
1
t
t∑
ℓ=1
yjℓ =
α
t
t∑
ℓ=1
wjℓ + x = α
t∑
ℓ=1
n∑
i=1
bijℓ
t
ui + x.
In colluder detection phase, we compute the correlation vector T = (T(1),T(2), . . . ,T(n)), where T(i) = 〈y−x
α
, ui〉,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, and 〈y−x
α
,ui〉 is the inner product of y−xα and ui. We would like to strategically design an anti-collusion code to
accurately identify the contributing fingerprints involved in the averaging attack from this detection statistics T. Note that in
code design phase, we only need to consider deterministic anti-collusion codes over a finite set.
III. FRAMEPROOF CODES AND STRONGLY SEPARABLE CODES
In this section, we first recall the traceability of frameproof codes (t-FPCs) for multimedia contents. Then we introduce the
notion of a strongly separable code (t-SSC). We show that a binary t-SSC has weaker requirements than a binary t-FPC but
has the same traceability as a binary t-FPC. We also present a composition construction for binary t-SSCs from q-ary t-SSCs.
Let n,M and q be positive integers, and Q an alphabet with |Q| = q. A set C = {c1, c2, . . . , cM} ⊆ Qn is called an
(n,M, q) code and each ci is called a codeword. Without loss of generality, we may assume Q = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}. When
Q = {0, 1}, we also use the word “binary”. Given an (n,M, q) code, its incidence matrix is the n×M matrix on Q in which
the columns are the M codewords in C. Often, we make no difference between an (n,M, q) code and its incidence matrix
unless otherwise stated.
For any code C ⊆ Qn, we define the set of ith coordinates of C as
C(i) = {c(i) ∈ Q | c = (c(1), c(2), . . . , c(n))T ∈ C}
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For any subset of codewords C′ ⊆ C, we define the descendant code of C′ as
desc(C
′
) = {(x(1),x(2), . . . ,x(n))T ∈ Qn | x(i) ∈ C
′
(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n},
that is,
desc(C
′
) = C
′
(1)× C
′
(2)× · · · × C
′
(n).
The set desc(C′) consists of the n-tuples that could be produced by a coalition holding the codewords in C′ .
Using the notions of descendant codes and sets of ith coordinates of codes, we can define frameproof codes which were
first introduced in [3].
Definition III.1. Let C be an (n,M, q) code and t ≥ 2 be an integer. C is a t-frameproof code, or t-FPC(n,M, q), if for any
C′ ⊆ C such that |C′| ≤ t, we have desc(C′)
⋂
C = C′, that is, for any c = (c(1), . . . , c(n))T ∈ C \ C′, there is at least one
coordinate i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that c(i) 6∈ C′(i).
Intuitively, an (n,M, q) code is a t-FPC if no coalition of size at most t can frame another user not in the coalition by
producing the codeword held by that user in generic digital fingerprinting. Frameproof codes were widely considered as having
no traceability for generic digital data (see for example [11]). However, Cheng and Miao [6] showed that frameproof codes
actually have traceability for multimedia contents. The main reason is explained below.
In the multimedia scenario, for any set of colluders holding codewords C0 ⊆ C and for any index 1 ≤ i ≤ n, their detection
statistics T(i) mentioned in Section II possesses the whole information on C0(i); namely, we have T(i) = 1 if and only if
3C0(i) = {1}, T(i) = 0 if and only if C0(i) = {0}, and 0 < T(i) < 1 if and only if C0(i) = {0, 1}. Therefore, we can capture
a set R = C0(1)× · · · × C0(n) ⊆ C(1)× · · · × C(n) in the multimedia scenario from the detection statistics T, instead of an
element d ∈ R in the generic digital scenario. The property a frameproof code holds makes it easy to identify C0, and thus
the set of colluders holding C0 who have produced R.
Lemma III.2. ([6]) Under the assumption that the number of colluders in the averaging attack is at most t, any t-FPC(n,M, 2)
can be used to identify all the colluders with computational complexity O(nM) by using the algorithm LACCIdenAlg in [6].
Algorithm 1: LACCIdenAlg(R)
Define Ja, Jo to be the sets of indices where R(j) = {1}, R(j) = {0}, respectively, and Ja = (Ja(1), . . . ,Ja(|Ja|))T ,
Jo = (Jo(1), . . . ,Jo(|Jo|))T to be the vector representing R’s coordinates where R(j) = {1} and R(j) = {0},
respectively;
Φ = 1;
U1 = ∅;
for k = 1 to |Ja| do
j = Ja(k);
define ej to be the jth row of C;
Φ = Φ · ej ;
for i = 1 to M do
if Φ(i) = 1 then
U1 = {i}
⋃
U1;
Φ = 1;
U2 = ∅;
for k = 1 to |Jo| do
j = Jo(k);
Φ = Φ · ej ;
for i = 1 to M do
if Φ(i) = 1 then
U2 = {i}
⋃
U2;
U = U1
⋂
U2;
if |U | ≤ t then
output U ;
else
output “The set of colluders has size at least t+ 1.”
The multimedia fingerprinting scheme based on a t-FPC(n,M, 2) can have at most r · 2⌈nt ⌉ +O(2⌈nt ⌉−1) authorized users,
where r is the unique integer such that r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t − 1} and r ≡ n (mod t) [2]. In most cases, this number of users is
still too small to be of practical use.
We now pay our attention to a new concept of a strongly separable code defined below, which can support a multimedia
fingerprinting scheme with more users than a t-FPC does.
Definition III.3. Let C be an (n,M, q) code and t ≥ 2 be an integer. C is a strongly t-separable code, or t-SSC(n,M, q), if
for any C0 ⊆ C, 1 ≤ |C0| ≤ t, we have
⋂
C′∈S(C0)
C
′
= C0, where S(C0) = {C
′
⊆ C | desc(C
′
) = desc(C0)}.
From the definition, it is clear that for any C′ ∈ S(C0) and C
′
6= C0, we have C0 ⊆ C
′
and |C′ | ≥ t+ 1.
The following theorem shows that a binary t-SSC can be used to identify all the colluders in the averaging attack with
computational complexity O(nM), which is the same as that of a binary t-FPC.
Theorem III.4. Under the assumption that the number of colluders in the averaging attack is at most t, any t-SSC(n,M, 2)
can be used to identify all the colluders with computational complexity O(nM) by applying Algorithm 2 described below.
Proof: Let C be the t-SSC(n,M, 2), and R be the descendant code derived from the detection statistics T. Then by
applying the following tracing algorithm, Algorithm 2, one can identify all the colluders. The computational complexity is
clearly O(nM).
According to Algorithm 2, by deleting all columns {c ∈ C | ∃ 1 ≤ i ≤ n,R(i) = {1}, c(i) = 0, or R(i) = {0}, c(i) = 1},
we obtain a sub-matrix CL of C. Suppose that C0 = {u1, u2, . . . , ur}, 1 ≤ r ≤ t, is the set of colluders, the codeword ci is
assigned to the colluder ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ r, and C0 = {c1, c2, . . . , cr}. It is not difficult to see that C0 ⊆ CL. According to the
4Algorithm 2: SSCTraceAlg(R)
Define Ja, Jo to be the sets of indices where R(j) = {1}, R(j) = {0}, respectively, and Ja = (Ja(1), . . . ,Ja(|Ja|))T ,
Jo = (Jo(1), . . . ,Jo(|Jo|))T to be the vector representing R’s coordinates where R(j) = {1} and R(j) = {0},
respectively;
Φ = 1;
Ua = ∅;
Uo = ∅;
U = ∅;
for k = 1 to |Ja| do
j = Ja(k);
define ej to be the jth row of C;
Φ = Φ · ej ;
for k = 1 to |Jo| do
j = Jo(k);
Φ = Φ · ej ;
for k = 1 to n do
Φa = Φ · ek;
Φo = Φ · ek;
for i = 1 to M do
if Φa(i) = 1 then
Ua = {i}
⋃
Ua;
if |Ua| = 1 then
U = U
⋃
Ua;
for i = 1 to M do
if Φo(i) = 1 then
Uo = {i}
⋃
Uo;
if |Uo| = 1 then
U = U
⋃
Uo;
if |U | ≤ t then
output U ;
else
output “The set of colluders has size at least t+ 1.”
definition of a t-SSC, we have
⋂
C′∈S(C0)
C
′
= C0 6= ∅, where S(C0) = {C
′
⊆ C | desc(C
′
) = desc(C0) = R}. We prove this
theorem in three steps.
(1) CL ∈ S(C0), that is, desc(CL) = R. For any 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we consider the following cases.
(1.1) R(j) = {1}. For any c ∈ CL, c(j) = 1 according to the processes deriving CL. So CL(j) = {1} = R(j).
(1.2) R(j) = {0}. For any c ∈ CL, c(j) = 0 according to the processes deriving CL. So CL(j) = {0} = R(j).
(1.3) R(j) = {0, 1}. Since desc(C0) = R, we know that there exist c1, c2 ∈ C0 ⊆ CL such that c1(j) = 0 and c2(j) = 1,
respectively. This implies CL(j) = {0, 1} = R(j).
According to (1.1)-(1.3) above, for any 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have CL(j) = R(j), which implies desc(CL) = R.
(2) We want to show that for any x ∈ C0 =
⋂
C′∈S(C0)
C
′
, there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ n, such that x(j) = 1 and c(j) = 0 for any
c ∈ CL \ {x}, or x(j) = 0 and c(j) = 1 for any c ∈ CL \ {x}. Assume not. Then for any 1 ≤ j ≤ n, x(j) = 1 implies that
there exists c1 ∈ CL \ {x} such that c1(j) = 1, and x(j) = 0 implies that there exists c2 ∈ CL \ {x} such that c2(j) = 0.
Then we have desc(CL) = desc(CL \ {x}). Since CL ∈ S(C0) by (1), we can have CL \ {x} ∈ S(C0), and x /∈
⋂
C′∈S(C0)
C
′
,
a contradiction.
(3) At last, according to Algorithm 2 and (2), it suffices to show that any user u assigned with a codeword x ∈ C0 =⋂
C′∈S(C0)
C
′ is a colluder. Assume that u is not a colluder. Then for any C′ ∈ S(C0), we have C
′
\{x} ∈ S(C0), which implies
x /∈
⋂
C′∈S(C0)
C
′
, a contradiction.
This completes the proof.
We now consider the relationship between a t-FPC(n,M, q) and a t-SSC(n,M, q).
Lemma III.5. Any t-FPC(n,M, q) is a t-SSC(n,M, q).
5Proof: Let C be a t-FPC(n,M, q). We are going to show that for any C0 ⊆ C, |C0| ≤ t, S(C0) = {C′ ⊆ C | desc(C′) =
desc(C0)} = {C0}. Assume that there exists C
′
∈ S(C0) such that C
′
6= C0.
(1) If |C′ | ≥ |C0|, then there exists c ∈ C′ ⊆ C such that c /∈ C0. Since desc(C′) = desc(C0), we have c ∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C,
while |C0| ≤ t, a contradiction to the definition of a t-FPC.
(2) If |C′ | < |C0| ≤ t, then there exists c ∈ C0 ⊆ C such that c /∈ C′ . Since desc(C′) = desc(C0), we have c ∈ desc(C′)
⋂
C,
while |C′ | < t, a contradiction to the definition of a t-FPC.
According to the discussions above, we have S(C0) = {C0}, which implies
⋂
C′∈S(C0)
C
′
= C0.
The following example shows that the converse of Lemma III.5 does not always hold.
Example III.6. Consider the following (3, 4, 2) code C:
c1 c2 c3 c4
C =

 0 1 0 00 0 1 0
0 0 0 1


We can directly check that C is a 2-SSC(3, 4, 2). Now, we show that C is not a 2-FPC. For C′ = {c2, c3}, desc(C′)
⋂
C =
{c1, c2, c3} 6= C′. This is a contradiction to the definition of a 2-FPC.
We would like to make a remark here. From Theorem III.4, Lemmas III.2, III.5, we can know that t-SSC(n,M, 2)s have
weaker requirements than t-FPC(n,M, 2)s but have the same traceability as t-FPC(n,M, 2)s.
At the end of this section, we show a composition construction for binary t-SSCs from q-ary t-SSCs, which makes the study
of q-ary t-SSCs with short length, say n = 2, 3, important.
Lemma III.7. If there exists a t-SSC(n,M, q), then there exists a t-SSC(nq,M, 2).
Proof: Let C = {c1, c2, . . . , cM} be a t-SSC(n,M, q) on Q = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}, and E = {e1, e2, . . . , eq}, where ei
is the ith identity vector of length q. Let f : Q → E be a bijective mapping such that f(i) = ei+1. For any codeword
c = (c(1), c(2), . . . , c(n))T ∈ C, we define f(c) = (f(c(1)), f(c(2)), . . . , f(c(n)))T . Obviously, f(c) is a binary vector of
length nq. We define a new (nq,M, 2) code F = {f(c1), f(c2), . . . , f(cM )}. We can show that F is a t-SSC.
For any F0 ⊆ F , |F0| ≤ t, we only need to show that for any F1 ⊆ F , desc(F0) = desc(F1) implies F0 ⊆ F1. Suppose
F0, F1 correspond to two codeword sets C0, C1 ⊆ C, respectively, such that |C0| = |F0| ≤ t, where F0 = {f(c) | c ∈ C0}
and F1 = {f(c) | c ∈ C1}. Since desc(F0) = desc(F1), we have desc(C0) = desc(C1). Then C0 ⊆ C1, because C is a
t-SSC(n,M, q). So, F0 ⊆ F1.
This completes the proof.
IV. CONSTRUCTIONS FOR STRONGLY SEPARABLE CODES
Let M(t, n, q) denote the maximum number of codewords in a t-SSC(n,M, q). A t-SSC(n,M, q) is optimal if M =
M(t, n, q). In this section, the relationship between strongly separable codes and separable codes is considered, and several
infinite series of optimal 2-SSCs of length 2 are derived based on this relationship. We also obtain the forbidden configurations
of 2-SSC(3,M, q)s. Finally, we present a construction for 2-SSC(3,M, q)s, where M is nearly equal to 98q
2
.
A. Relationship between Strongly Separable Codes and Separable Codes
In this subsection, we first recall the concept of a separable code introduced in [6] and investigated in detail in [5], [8],
which is a powerful tool to investigate SSCs.
Definition IV.1. ([6]) Let C be an (n,M, q) code and t ≥ 2 be an integer. C is a t-separable code, or t-SC(n,M, q), if for
any C1, C2 ⊆ C such that 1 ≤ |C1| ≤ t, 1 ≤ |C2| ≤ t and C1 6= C2, we have desc(C1) 6= desc(C2), that is, there is at least one
coordinate i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that C1(i) 6= C2(i).
Recall that for any C′ ∈ S(C0) and C
′
6= C0, we have C0 ⊆ C
′
and |C′ | ≥ t + 1. In other words, for any t-SSC(n,M, q),
C, there are no distinct subsets C1, C2 ⊆ C with 1 ≤ |C1| ≤ t, 1 ≤ |C2| ≤ t, such that desc(C1) = desc(C2). This implies the
following lemma.
Lemma IV.2. Any t-SSC(n,M, q) is a t-SC(n,M, q).
The following example shows that the converse of Lemma IV.2 does not always hold.
Example IV.3. Consider the following (3, 5, 2) code C:
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
C =

 0 1 0 0 10 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 1


6We can directly check that C is a 2-SC(3, 5, 2). Now, we show that C is not a 2-SSC. Let C0 = {c1, c5} and C
′
= {c2, c3, c4},
then desc(C0) = desc(C
′
), while C0 6⊆ C
′
. This implies that C is not a 2-SSC(3, 5, 2).
However, the following result shows that a 2-SSC(2,M, q) is always a 2-SC(2,M, q).
Theorem IV.4. Let C be a (2,M, q) code. Then C is a 2-SSC(2,M, q) if and only if it is a 2-SC(2,M, q).
Proof: By Lemma IV.2, it suffices to consider the sufficiency. Let C be a 2-SC(2,M, q). Assume that C is not a 2-
SSC(2,M, q). Then there exist C0, C
′
⊆ C, |C0| ≤ 2, such that desc(C0) = desc(C
′
) but C0 6⊆ C
′
. If |C0| = 1, then it is clear
that C0 = C
′
, a contradiction. So |C0| = 2. Let C0 = {c1, c2}, ci = (ai, bi)T , where i = 1, 2. Since C is a 2-SC(2,M, q) and
desc(C0) = desc(C
′
), we have C′ ⊆ desc(C0)
⋂
C and |C′ | ≥ 3. We now consider the Hamming distance d(c1, c2) of c1 and
c2 .
(1) If d(c1, c2) = 1, without loss of generality, we may assume a1 = a2, b1 6= b2. Then |desc(C0)| = 2. So |C′ | ≤
|desc(C0)| = 2, a contradiction.
(2) If d(c1, c2) = 2, then a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2, and desc(C0) = {c1, c2, c3, c4}, where c3 = (a1, b2)T and c4 = (a2, b1)T .
Then |desc(C0)
⋂
C| ≤ 3. Otherwise, if |desc(C0)
⋂
C| = 4, i.e., desc(C0)
⋂
C = {c1, c2, c3, c4}, then desc({c1, c2}) =
desc({c3, c4}), a contradiction to the definition of a 2-SC. Since C
′
⊆ desc(C0)
⋂
C and |C′ | ≥ 3, we have |C′ | = 3. So, we
may assume, without loss of generality, that C′ = {c1, c2, c3}, which implies C0 ⊆ C
′
, a contradiction.
This completes the proof.
2-SCs were well studied in [4], [5], and several infinite series of optimal 2-SC(2,M, q)s were constructed.
Lemma IV.5. ([4], [5]) Let k ≥ 2 be a prime power. Then there is an optimal 2-SC(2,M, q) for any q ∈ {k2 − 1, k2 + k −
2, k2 + k − 1, k2 + k, k2 + k + 1}.
These optimal SCs are, in fact, optimal SSCs from the equivalence stated in Theorem IV.4.
Corollary IV.6. Let k ≥ 2 be a prime power. Then there is an optimal 2-SSC(2,M, q) for any q ∈ {k2 − 1, k2 + k − 2, k2 +
k − 1, k2 + k, k2 + k + 1}.
We note that a 2-FPC(2,M, q) can roughly have at most 2q codewords [2], but the optimal 2-SSC(2,M, q)s in Corollary
IV.6 can have about q 32 codewords [4], [5].
B. Constructions for 2-SSC(3,M, q)s
From Lemma IV.2, any 2-SSC(3, M, q) is a 2-SC(3,M, q). Therefore, we can start from 2-SC(3,M, q)s to investigate
2-SSC(3,M, q)s. At first, we derive forbidden configurations of a 2-SSC(3,M, q).
Lemma IV.7. Let C be a 2-SC(3,M, q). If there exist C0, C′ ⊆ C, |C0| ≤ 2 such that desc(C0) = desc(C′) and C0 6⊆ C′ , then
C0 = {c1, c2} and the Hamming distance d(c1, c2) /∈ {0, 1, 2}.
Proof: If |C0| = 1, then it is clear that C0 = C′ , a contradiction. So |C0| = 2. Let C0 = {c1, c2}, ci = (ai, bi, ei), c1 6= c2.
Since C is a 2-SC(3,M, q) and desc(C0) = desc(C
′
), we have C′ ⊆ desc(C0)
⋂
C and |C′ | ≥ 3.
(1) If d(c1, c2) = 1, we may assume, without loss of generality, that a1 = a2, b1 = b2, e1 6= e2. Then |desc(C0)| = 2. So
|C
′
| ≤ |desc(C0)| = 2, a contradiction.
(2) If d(c1, c2) = 2, we may assume, without loss of generality, a1 = a2, b1 6= b2, e1 6= e2. Then desc(C0) =
{c1, c2, c3, c4}, where c3 = (a1, b1, e2)T and c4 = (a1, b2, e1)T . Then |desc(C0)
⋂
C| ≤ 3. Otherwise, if |desc(C0)
⋂
C| = 4,
i.e., desc(C0)
⋂
C = {c1, c2, c3, c4}, then desc({c1, c2}) = desc({c3, c4}), a contradiction to the definition of a 2-SC. Since
C
′
⊆ desc(C0)
⋂
C and |C′ | ≥ 3, we have |C′ | = 3. So, we may assume, without loss of generality, that C′ = {c1, c2, c3}. This
implies C0 ⊆ C
′
, a contradiction.
This completes the proof.
Lemma IV.8. Let C be a 2-SC(3,M, q). If there exist C0, C′ ⊆ C, |C0| ≤ 2, such that desc(C0) = desc(C′) and C0 6⊆ C′ , then
desc(C0)
⋂
C is of one of the following four types:
Type I: Type II:
 a1 a2 a1 a1b1 b2 b1 b2
e1 e2 e2 e1

 ,

 a1 a2 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b1
e1 e2 e2 e1

 ,
Type III: Type IV:
 a1 a2 a1 a2b1 b2 b2 b1
e1 e2 e1 e1

 ,

 a1 a2 a1 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b2 b1
e1 e2 e2 e1 e1

 ,
7where C0 = {c1, c2}, ci = (ai, bi, ei), i = 1, 2, and a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2, e1 6= e2.
Proof: According to Lemma IV.7, we can only have C0 = {c1, c2}, ci = (ai, bi, ei)T , where i = 1, 2, a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2,
and e1 6= e2. Then desc(C0) = {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, c8}, where c3 = (a1, b1, e2)T , c4 = (a1, b2, e1)T , c5 = (a2, b1, e1)T ,
c6 = (a2, b2, e1)
T
, c7 = (a2, b1, e2)
T
, c8 = (a1, b2, e2)
T
.
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8
desc(C0) =

 a1 a2 a1 a1 a2 a2 a2 a1b1 b2 b1 b2 b1 b2 b1 b2
e1 e2 e2 e1 e1 e1 e2 e2


Let Bi = {ci+2, ci+5}, where 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. Then for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, we have Bi 6⊆ desc(C0)
⋂
C. Otherwise, desc(C0) =
desc(Bi), a contradiction to the definition of a 2-SC. Since C is a 2-SC(3,M, q) and desc(C0) = desc(C
′
), we have C′ ⊆
desc(C0)
⋂
C and |C′ | ≥ 3.
If desc(C0)
⋂
C = C0, then C
′
⊆ C0, and thus |C
′
| ≤ |C0| = 2, a contradiction. So desc(C0)
⋂
C contains at least one of
the words c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, c8. Without loss of generality, we may assume c3 ∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C. Then c6 /∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C. If
desc(C0)
⋂
C = {c1, c2, c3}, since C
′
⊆ desc(C0)
⋂
C and |C′ | ≥ 3, we have C′ = {c1, c2, c3}, which implies C0 ⊆ C
′
, a
contradiction. So desc(C0)
⋂
C should contain at least one of the words c4, c5, c7, c8.
(1) If c4 ∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C, then c7 /∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C. We also have c8 /∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C, otherwise, desc({c1, c8}) = desc({c3, c4}),
a contradiction. So, if c5 /∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C, then desc(C0)
⋂
C is of Type I, and if c5 ∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C, then desc(C0)
⋂
C is of
Type IV.
(2) If c5 ∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C, then c8 /∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C. We also have c7 /∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C, otherwise, desc({c1, c7}) = desc({c3, c5}),
a contradiction. So, if c4 /∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C, then desc(C0)
⋂
C is of Type II, and if c4 ∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C, then desc(C0)
⋂
C is of
Type IV.
(3) If c7 ∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C, then c4 /∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C. Also, c5 /∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C, otherwise, desc({c1, c7}) = desc({c3, c5}),
a contradiction. We further have c8 /∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C, otherwise, desc({c2, c3}) = desc({c7, c8}), a contradiction. So, in this
case, desc(C0)
⋂
C = {c1, c2, c3, c7}.
c1 c2 c3 c7
desc(C0)
⋂
C =

 a1 a2 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b1
e1 e2 e2 e2


If c1 /∈ C
′ (or c2 /∈ C′ ), then e1 /∈ C′(3) (or b2 /∈ C′(2)), which implies desc(C′) 6= desc(C0). Hence c1, c2 ∈ C′ , which implies
C0 ⊆ C
′
, a contradiction. So this case is impossible.
(4) If c8 ∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C, then c5 /∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C. Also, c4 /∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C, otherwise, desc({c1, c8}) = desc({c3, c4}),
a contradiction. We further have c7 /∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C, otherwise, desc({c2, c3}) = desc({c7, c8}), a contradiction. So, in this
case, desc(C0)
⋂
C = {c1, c2, c3, c8}.
c1 c2 c3 c8
desc(C0)
⋂
C =

 a1 a2 a1 a1b1 b2 b1 b2
e1 e2 e2 e2


If c1 /∈ C
′ (or c2 /∈ C′), then e1 /∈ C′(3) (or a2 /∈ C′(1)), which implies desc(C′) 6= desc(C0). Hence c1, c2 ∈ C′ , which implies
C0 ⊆ C
′
, a contradiction. So this case is impossible.
This completes the proof.
Theorem IV.9. Let C be a 2-SC(3,M, q). Then C is a 2-SSC(3,M, q) if and only if for any C0 = {c1, c2} = {(a1, b1, e1)T ,
(a2, b2, e2)
T } ⊆ C, where a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2, and e1 6= e2, we have that desc(C0)
⋂
C is not of one of the following four types:
Type I: Type II:
 a1 a2 a1 a1b1 b2 b1 b2
e1 e2 e2 e1

 ,

 a1 a2 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b1
e1 e2 e2 e1

 ,
Type III: Type IV:
 a1 a2 a1 a2b1 b2 b2 b1
e1 e2 e1 e1

 ,

 a1 a2 a1 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b2 b1
e1 e2 e2 e1 e1

 ,
8Proof: Suppose that C is a 2-SSC(3,M, q). Assume that there exists C0 = {c1, c2} = {(a1, b1, e1)T , (a2, b2, e2)T } ⊆ C,
where a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2, and e1 6= e2, such that desc(C0)
⋂
C is of one of the four types. For convenience, let c3 = (a1, b1, e2)T ,
c4 = (a1, b2, e1)
T
, c5 = (a2, b1, e1)
T
.
(1) If desc(C0)
⋂
C is of type I, then desc({c1, c2}) = desc({c2, c3, c4}), while {c1, c2} 6⊆ {c2, c3, c4}, a contradiction to
the definition of a 2-SSC. So this case is impossible.
(2) If desc(C0)
⋂
C is of type II, then desc({c1, c2}) = desc({c2, c3, c5}), while {c1, c2} 6⊆ {c2, c3, c5}, a contradiction to
the definition of a 2-SSC. So this case is impossible.
(3) If desc(C0)
⋂
C is of type III, then desc({c1, c2}) = desc({c2, c4, c5}), while {c1, c2} 6⊆ {c2, c4, c5}, a contradiction
to the definition of a 2-SSC. So this case is impossible.
(4) If desc(C0)
⋂
C is of type IV, then desc({c1, c2}) = desc({c3, c4, c5}), while {c1, c2} 6⊆ {c3, c4, c5}, a contradiction
to the definition of a 2-SSC. So this case is impossible.
So, desc(C0)
⋂
C is not of one of the four types described above.
Conversely, suppose that C is a 2-SC(3,M, q), and for any C0 = {c1, c2} = {(a1, b1, e1)T ,
(a2, b2, e2)
T } ⊆ C, where a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2, and e1 6= e2, we have that desc(C0)
⋂
C is not of one of the four types. If C is not
a 2-SSC(3,M, q), then there exist C1 ⊆ C, |C1| ≤ 2, and C
′
∈ S(C1) = {C
′
⊆ C | desc(C
′
) = desc(C1)}, such that C1 6⊆ C
′
.
According to Lemma IV.8, C1 = {c
′
1, c
′
2} = {(a
′
1, b
′
1, e
′
1)
T , (a
′
2, b
′
2, e
′
2)
T } ⊆ C, where a′1 6= a
′
2, b
′
1 6= b
′
2, and e
′
1 6= e
′
2, such
that desc(C1)
⋂
C is of one of the four types, a contradiction. So C is a 2-SSC(3,M, q).
Now, we pay our attention to the construction of 2-SSCs of length 3 via the discussion above.
For any (n,M, q) code C on Q = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}, Cheng et al. [5] defined the following shortened code Aji for i ∈ Q
and 1 ≤ j ≤ n:
Aji = {(c(1), . . . , c(j − 1), c(j + 1), . . . , c(n))
T | (c(1), . . . , c(n))T ∈ C, c(j) = i}.
Lemma IV.10. ([5]) A (3,M, q) code is a 2-SC(3,M, q) on Q if and only if |Ajg1
⋂
Ajg2 | ≤ 1 holds for any 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, and
any distinct g1, g2 ∈ Q.
Lemma IV.11. Let C be a (3,M, q) code on Q. If for any C0 ⊆ C, |C0| ≤ 2, we have |desc(C0)
⋂
C| ≤ 3, then C is a
2-SSC(3,M, q).
Proof: We first show that C is a 2-SC(3,M, q). Assume not. According to Lemma IV.10, we may assume, without loss of
generality, that there exist two distinct g1, g2 ∈ Q such that |A1g1
⋂
A1g2 | ≥ 2. Suppose (b1, e1)
T , (b2, e2)
T ∈ A1g1
⋂
A1g2 , where
(b1, e1)
T 6= (b2, e2)T . Then (g1, b1, e1)T , (g2, b1, e1)T , (g1, b2, e2)T , (g2, b2, e2)T ∈ C, which imply |desc({(g1, b1, e1)T , (g2,
b2, e2)
T })
⋂
C| ≥ 4, a contradiction to the hypothesis. So C is a 2-SC(3,M, q). Next, we prove it is in fact a 2-SSC. Since
for any C0 ⊆ C, |C0| ≤ 2, |desc(C0)
⋂
C| ≤ 3 always holds, we know that desc(C0)
⋂
C can not be of any of the four types
mentioned in Theorem IV.9. So C is a 2-SSC(3,M, q) from Theorem IV.9.
In order to describe our construction for 2-SSCs of length 3, we need s new elements ∞i /∈ Zq−s, i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , s− 1} ⊆
Zq−s, such that for any g ∈ Zq−s and any i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , s− 1},
g +∞i =∞i + g = g · ∞i =∞i · g =∞i.
Based on Lemma IV.11, we can construct a 2-SSC as follows.
Lemma IV.12. Suppose that q is a positive integer, s is a non-negative integer, where 0 ≤ s ≤ q2 and q− s is odd. Then there
exists a 2-SSC(3, q2 + sq − 2s2, q).
Proof: We will prove this lemma in two steps. That is, we at first construct a (3, q2 + sq − 2s2, q) code, and then show
that it is in fact a 2-SSC.
Since q − s is odd and 0 ≤ s ≤ q2 , we can construct a code C on Q = {∞0,∞1, . . . , ∞s−1}
⋃
Zq−s as follows. Let
Ms =

 0 0 · · · 00 1 · · · q − s− 1
0 2 · · · 2(q − s− 1)

 , Mi =

 ∞i i 00 ∞i i
i 0 ∞i

 ,
i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , s − 1}. Define Dj = {c + g | c ∈ Mj , g ∈ Zq−s}, where 0 ≤ j ≤ s, and C =
⋃s
j=0Dj . Then C is a
(3, q2 + sq − 2s2, q) code on Q.
According to Lemma IV.11, in order to prove that C is a 2-SSC(3, q2+sq−2s2, q), it suffices to check that |desc(C0)
⋂
C| ≤ 3
always holds for any C0 ⊆ C, |C0| ≤ 2. We will check this in two steps.
(1) At first, we prove that for any distinct g1, g2 ∈ Q, (g1, g2) ∈ {∞0,∞1, . . . ,∞s−1}2
⋃
Z2q−s, |A
i
g1
⋂
Aig2 | = 0 always
holds for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. We only need to consider the case |A1g1
⋂
A1g2 | = 0, because we can consider the other two cases in
a similar way.
(1.1) For any 0 ≤ i < j ≤ s − 1, we have A1∞i
⋂
A1∞j = ∅. Assume that (b, e)
T ∈ A1∞i
⋂
A1∞j . Then there exist
b1, b2 ∈ Zq−s, such that (b, e)T = (b1, b1 + i)T = (b2, b2 + j)T , which implies b1 = b2 = b, and i = j, a contradiction.
9(1.2) For any distinct i, j ∈ Zq−s, we have A1i
⋂
A1j = ∅. Assume that (b, e)T ∈ A1i
⋂
A1j .
(1.2.A) If there exists 0 ≤ k ≤ s− 1 such that b =∞k, then (b, e)T = (∞k, i− k)T = (∞k, j − k)T , which implies i = j,
a contradiction.
(1.2.B) If there exists 0 ≤ k ≤ s− 1 such that e =∞k, then (b, e)T = (i+ k,∞k)T = (j + k,∞k)T , which implies i = j,
a contradiction.
(1.2.C) If b, e /∈ {∞0,∞1, . . . ,∞s−1}, then there exist b1, b2 ∈ Zq−s, such that (b, e)T = (i+ b1, i+ 2b1)T = (j + b2, j +
2b2)
T
. Hence i+ b1 = j + b2 and i+ 2b1 = j + 2b2, which imply b1 = b2 and i = j, a contradiction.
(2) According to (1), we know that for any distinct g1, g2 ∈ Q and any 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, |Aig1
⋂
Aig2 | ≥ 1 implies (g1, g2) ∈
Zq−s × {∞0,∞1, . . . ,∞s−1}. We are going to show that |desc(C0)
⋂
C| ≤ 3 always holds for any C0 ⊆ C, |C0| ≤ 2. If
|C0| = 1, then it is clear that |desc(C0)
⋂
C| = |C0| = 1. Now, we consider the case |C0| = 2. Suppose C0 = {c1, c2} =
{(a1, b1, e1)T , (a2, b2, e2)T } ⊆ C, where c1 6= c2. Consider the Hamming distance of c1 and c2.
(2.1) If d(c1, c2) = 1, then it is clear that |desc(C0)
⋂
C| = |C0| = 2.
(2.2) If d(c1, c2) = 2, without loss of generality, we may assume that a1 = a2, b1 6= b2, e1 6= e2. Then desc(C0) =
{c1, c2, c3, c4}, where c3 = (a1, b1, e2)T and c4 = (a1, b2, e1)T .
c1 c2 c3 c4
desc(C0) =

 a1 a1 a1 a1b1 b2 b1 b2
e1 e2 e2 e1


Assume that |desc(C0)
⋂
C| = 4, i.e. desc(C0)
⋂
C = {c1, c2, c3, c4}. Then |A3e1
⋂
A3e2 | ≥ 1, which implies that exactly one
of e1 and e2 is ∞i for some 0 ≤ i ≤ s− 1.
(2.2.A) If e1 =∞i, then c1 = c4, which implies |desc(C0)
⋂
C| ≤ 3, a contradiction.
(2.2.B) If e2 =∞i, then c2 = c3, which implies |desc(C0)
⋂
C| ≤ 3, a contradiction.
So, if d(c1, c2) = 2, |desc(C0)
⋂
C| ≤ 3 always holds.
(2.3) If d(c1, c2) = 3, then a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2, e1 6= e2, and desc(C0) = {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6,
c7, c8}, where c3 = (a1, b1, e2)T , c4 = (a1, b2, e1)T , c5 = (a2, b1, e1)T , c6 = (a2, b2, e1)T , c7 = (a2, b1, e2)T , c8 =
(a1, b2, e2)
T
.
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8
desc(C0) =

 a1 a2 a1 a1 a2 a2 a2 a1b1 b2 b1 b2 b1 b2 b1 b2
e1 e2 e2 e1 e1 e1 e2 e2


We are going to show that desc(C0)
⋂
C contains at most one element of the set B = {c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, c8}. Assume not.
Then there exist two elements c′ , c′′ of B contained in desc(C0)
⋂
C, where
{c
′
, c
′′
} ∈ {{c3, c4}, {c3, c5}, {c3, c6}, {c3, c7}, {c3, c8}, {c4, c5}, {c4, c6},
{c4, c7}, {c4, c8}, {c5, c6}, {c5, c7}, {c5, c8}, {c6, c7}, {c6, c8}, {c7, c8}}.
However, we can prove none of them is possible.
(2.3.A) If {c′ , c′′} = {c3, c4}, then we have {c1, c2, c3, c4} ⊆ desc(C0)
⋂
C.
c1 c2 c3 c4
 a1 a2 a1 a1b1 b2 b1 b2
e1 e2 e2 e1


Then |A3e1
⋂
A3e2 | ≥ 1 (from c1 and c3) and |A2b1
⋂
A2b2 | ≥ 1 (from c1 and c4). Hence there exist 0 ≤ i, j ≤ s− 1 such that
exactly one of e1 and e2 is ∞i, and exactly one of b1 and b2 is ∞j .
(2.3.A.a) If e1 =∞i, then ∞j /∈ {b1, b2} from c1 and c4, a contradiction. So, this case is impossible.
(2.3.A.b) If e2 =∞i, then ∞j /∈ {b1, b2} from c2 and c3, a contradiction. So, this case is impossible.
Similarly, we can know that it is impossible for
{c
′
, c
′′
} ∈ {{c3, c5}, {c4, c5}, {c6, c7}, {c6, c8}, {c7, c8}}.
(2.3.B) If {c′ , c′′} = {c3, c6}, then we have {c1, c2, c3, c6} ⊆ desc(C0)
⋂
C.
c1 c2 c3 c6
 a1 a2 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b2
e1 e2 e2 e1


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Then |A3e1
⋂
A3e2 | ≥ 1 (from c1 and c3). Hence, without loss of generality, we may assume that e1 ∈ Zq−s and there exists
0 ≤ i ≤ s− 1 such that e2 =∞i. Then we can derive that a1, a2, b1 = a1 + i, b2 = a2 + i ∈ Zq−s, which imply c1, c6 ∈ Ds.
So we can derive e1 = a1 + 2i = a2 + 2i, which implies a1 = a2, a contradiction. So this case is impossible.
Similarly, it is impossible that {c′ , c′′} ∈ {{c4, c7}, {c5, c8}}.
(2.3.C) If {c′ , c′′} = {c3, c7}, then we have {c1, c2, c3, c7} ⊆ desc(C0)
⋂
C.
c1 c2 c3 c7
 a1 a2 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b1
e1 e2 e2 e2


Then |A3e1
⋂
A3e2 | ≥ 1 (from c1 and c3), |A2b1
⋂
A2b2 | ≥ 1 (from c2 and c7), and |A1a1
⋂
A1a2 | ≥ 1 (from c3 and c7). Hence
there exists 0 ≤ i, j, k ≤ s − 1 such that exactly one of e1 and e2 is ∞i, and ∞j ∈ {b1, b2}, ∞k ∈ {a1, a2}. Then at least
one of (a1, b1, e1)T and (a2, b2, e2)T contains at least two components from {∞0,∞1, . . . ,∞s−1}, a contradiction. So this
case is impossible.
Similarly, it is impossible that
{c
′
, c
′′
} ∈ {{c3, c8}, {c4, c6}, {c4, c8}, {c5, c6}, {c5, c7}}.
The conclusion then comes from Lemma IV.11.
Theorem IV.13. There exists a 2-SSC(3, 18 (9q2 −w2), q) for any positive integer q, with m being the residue of q modulo 8,
and
w =
{
4−m, if m ≡ 0 (mod 4),
min{m, 8−m}, otherwise.
Proof: According to Lemma IV.12, there exists a 2-SSC(3, q2 + sq− 2s2, q) for any positive integer q, where 0 ≤ s ≤ q2 ,
and q − s is odd. Let q = 8r +m, where r is a non-negative integer, and f(s) = q2 + sq − 2s2 = −2(s− q4 )
2 + 98q
2
. Now,
we are going to find the maximum value of f(s), where 0 ≤ s ≤ q2 and q − s is odd.
(1) If m = 0, then q is even. Since q4 = 2r is even, s = 2r− 1 = q−44 is odd, then q− s is odd, and f( q−44 ) = 18 (9q2− 42)
is the maximum value of f(s).
(2) If m = 1, then q is odd and q4 = 2r + 14 . Since s = 2r = q−14 is even, then q − s is odd, and f( q−14 ) = 18 (9q2 − 1) is
the maximum value of f(s).
(3) If m = 2, then q is even and q4 = 2r+ 24 . Since s = 2r+1 = q+24 is odd, then q− s is odd, and f( q+24 ) = 18 (9q2− 22)
is the maximum value of f(s).
(4) If m = 3, then q is odd and q4 = 2r+ 34 . Since s = 2r = q−34 is even, then q − s is odd, and f( q−34 ) = 18 (9q2 − 32) is
the maximum value of f(s).
(5) If m = 4, then q is even. Since s = 2r + 1 = q4 is odd, then q − s is odd, and f( q4 ) = 98q2 is the maximum value of
f(s).
(6) If m = 5, then q is odd and q4 = 2r+ 54 . Since s = 2r+2 = q+34 is even, then q− s is odd, and f( q+34 ) = 18 (9q2− 32)
is the maximum value of f(s).
(7) If m = 6, then q is even and q4 = 2r+ 64 . Since s = 2r+1 = q−24 is odd, then q− s is odd, and f( q−24 ) = 18 (9q2− 22)
is the maximum value of f(s).
(8) If m = 7, then q is odd and q4 = 2r+ 74 . Since s = 2r+ 2 = q+14 is even, then q− s is odd, and f( q+14 ) = 18 (9q2 − 1)
is the maximum value of f(s).
We can summarize the results obtained in (1)-(8) into the following table, from which the conclusion comes.
m w s f(s)
0 4 14 (q − 4)
1
8 (9q
2 − 42)
1 1 14 (q − 1)
1
8 (9q
2 − 12)
2 2 14 (q + 2)
1
8 (9q
2 − 22)
3 3 14 (q − 3)
1
8 (9q
2 − 32)
4 0 q4
9
8q
2
5 3 14 (q + 3)
1
8 (9q
2 − 32)
6 2 14 (q − 2)
1
8 (9q
2 − 22)
7 1 14 (q + 1)
1
8 (9q
2 − 12)
As is well-known, for any 2-FPC(3,M, q), we have M ≤ q2 (see for example [1]). Theorem IV.13 shows that there is an
infinite series of 2-SSC(3,M ′ , q)s which have more than 12.5% codewords than 2-FPC(3,M, q)s could have. For example,
we compare the number of codewords between 2-FPC(3, q2, q) and 2-SSC(3, 98q
2, q), where q ≡ 4 (mod 8) and 4 ≤ q ≤ 100.
11
q q2 (FPC) 98q2 (SSC)
4 16 18
12 144 162
20 400 450
28 784 882
36 1296 1458
44 1936 2178
52 2704 3042
60 3600 4050
68 4624 5202
76 5776 6498
84 7056 7938
92 8464 9522
100 10000 11250
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we first introduced a new notion of an SSC for multimedia fingerprinting to resist the averaging attack, and
considered its tracing algorithm to identify colluders. We showed that SSCs are weaker than frameproof codes, and can be
used to identify all colluders with computational complexity linear to the product of the length of the code and the number of
authorized users. We also obtained several infinite series of optimal 2-SSCs of length 2, and constructed an infinite series of
2-SSCs of length 3 with many codewords.
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